Oar    S 


\xr     oe.aow 


<L     ^3or^vV>aiArdLyAeA^ 


£    Par*"     Pla^^r 


STEPHEN  Bo  WEEKS 

CUSS  0F1886;PH.D.  THE  JOHNS  HOPKINS  UNIVERSITY 


OF  THE 


©F 

MI 


p9TO.'1Sii35ls 


KETCH 


iUR  SECOND  BOMBARDMENT 


FORI"  FISHER. 


A    SKETCH 


OUR  SECOND  BOMBARDMENT 


FORT  FISHER. 


A   PAPER 

READ  BEFORE  THE  DISTRICT  OF  COLUMBIA  COMMANDERY 

OF  THE 

MILITARY  ORDER 

OF    THE 

LOYAL  LEGION  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES, 

NOV.  2,  I887. 
BY  COMPANION 

DANIEL  AMMEN, 

Rear  Admiral  U.  S.  Navy. 


WASHINGTON,  D.   C. : 

JUDD  &  DETWEILER,  PRINTERS. 

1887. 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2013 


http://archive.org/details/sketchofourseconOOamme 


#uv  3 MM&  Iflwtotlmtfttt  of  £mt  M&htx. 


In 


I  propose  a  brief  sketch  of  the  second  bombardment  of  Fort 
Fisher  and  the  taking  of  it  by  assault,  and  some  remarks  as  to  the 
value  of  spherical-shell  guns  in  attacking  earthworks.  Comrades 
will  remember  that  we  had  bombarded  Fort  Fisher  three  weeks 
previously;  the  second  time  we  came  to  stay,  no  matter  what  the 
enemy  might  do  to  discourage  us.  Had  the  assault  failed,  the 
troops  would  have  continued  to  occupy  the  sand  spit  north  of  the 
fort,  and  torpedo  and  other  launches  would  have  been  taken  into 
the  river.  By  the  aid  of  calcium  lights,  steamers  could  then  no 
longer  have  passed  up  the  river  to  Wilmington.  Fort  Fisher, 
thereafter,  would  have  served  the  enemy  no  better  purpose  than 
if  situated  miles  away  at  sea.  I  have  reason  to  believe  that  such 
were  the  intentions  of  Gen.  Grant  had  the  assault  failed. 

On  the  morning  of  the  13th  January,  '65,  one  hundred  vessels 
(in  round  numbers)  were  at  anchor  twelve  miles  east  of  Fort 
Fisher.  About  three-fourths  were  vessels  of  war  of  all  grades  ; 
the  remainder  were  army  transports  carrying  12,000  men,  under 
the  command  of  Gen.  Terry.  About  sunrise  they  all  got  under 
way — the  ironclads  to  attack  the  fort,  and  the  wooden  vessels  of 
war,  and  the  transports,  to  land  the  troops,  with  as  much  despatch 
as  possible,  some  five  miles  north  of  the  fort,  on  an  open  sand 
beach. 

The  Ironsides  led  four  vessels  of  the  monitor  class:  the  Monad- 
nock,  with  two  turrets  and  four  guns;  the  Canonicus,  Mahopac, 
and  Saugus,  with  two  guns  each,  making  ten  15 -inch  spherical- 
shell  guns.  The  Ironsides  carried  in  broadside  seven  n-inch  guns 
and  an  8-inch  rifle  in  broadside,  a  formidable  battery  against  a 


—  4  — 

sand  fort,  making,  with  the  monitors,  eighteen  available  guns. 
As  soon  as  they  were  within  1800  yards,  the  fort  opened  fire  on 
them,  which  was  quite  disregarded  until  they  anchored  as  near  the 
beach  as  their  draught  would  permit.  The  Ironsides  was  then 
about  1000  and  the  nearest  monitor  700  yards  from  the  fort.  Then 
a  shell  or  so  was  thrown  from  each  vessel  with  a  carefully  studied 
elevation,  and  they  then  opened  fire,  which  was  actually  maintained 
by  some  of  them,  without  cessation,  for  three  days  and  two  nights. 

In  the  meantime,  the  wooden  vessels  of  war  and  the  army  trans- 
ports had  anchored  near  the  beach,  and  the  process  of  debarcation 
went  on  rapidly.  A  few  shells  had  been  previously  thrown  into 
the  brushwood,  to  arouse  any  lurking  enemy.  At  once  a  large  herd 
of  cattle,  frightened  at  the  bursting  shells  in  the  wood,  rushed 
wildly  to  the  beach.  They  had  been  provided  for  the  garrison  of 
the  fort,  but  surrendered  unconditionally,  and  were  doubtless  found 
useful  auxiliaries. 

At  2  p.  m.  half  of  the  army  force  had  landed.  The  second  line 
of  vessels,  led  by  Alden  in  the  Brooklyn,  and  followed  by  twelve 
gunboats,  left  soon  after  and  anchored  in  position  outside  of  the 
ironclads  and  a  little  to  the  northward,  so  as  to  destroy  the  guns 
on  the  land  face — the  intended  line  of  approach  of  the  land  force 
in  making  an  assault.  The  arrival  of  our  line  was  the  cause  of 
increased  activity  in  the  batteries  of  the  enemy :  they  had  sobered 
down  a  good  deal  under  the  discipline  of  the  ironclads  since  the 
morning.  The  heavy  vessels  of  war  left  the  landing  of  the  troops 
and  got  into  position  only  a  little  before  sunset,  having  been  delayed 
an  hour  by  the  fouling  of  the  screw  of  the  Minnesota,  the  leading 
vessel,  commanded  by  Lanman.  The  third  division  and  the 
reserve  line,  composed  of  the  weaker  vessels,  remained  to  com- 
plete the  landing  of  the  troops  and  all  of  the  stores,  which  was 
effected  by  noon  of  the  next  day. 

I  recall  no  sight  during  the  war  more  superbly  grand  than  the 
bombardment  of  that  evening.     As  the  sun  went  down  and  the 


—  5  — 

shadows  fell  upon  the  waters,  the  waning  light  made  the  bursting 
shells  flash  out  in  the  obscurity,  as  did  the  guns  of  the  enemy — so 
far  as  th;y  were  served  against  such  odds.  Far  above,  on  the 
fleecy  clouds,  rested  the  rosy  hues  from  the  departed  sun ;  and 
underneath,  in  heavy  masses,  not  high  above  the  fort,  laid  the 
smoke  clouds  of  battle.  It  was  superlatively  grand.  But  soon  the 
shadows  darkened  into  obscurity,  and  the  wooden  ships  were  with- 
drawn from  action.  All  that  livelong  night  did  the  ironclads  send 
their  shells,  slowly  and  effectively,  and,  as  found  necessary,  they 
were  supplied  with  ammunition  from  tugs,  during  that  and  the  fol- 
lowing night. 

In  the  forenoon  of  the  next  day,  the  wooden  vessels  of  all  classes 
came  in  on  the  lines  assigned  them,  the  frigates  about  a  mile  from 
the  fort,  and  double-enders  forming  another  line,  stretching  away 
towards  the  entrance  of  the  river  where  the  Mound  and  Buchanan 
batteries  were  located.  The  fleet,  as  before,  directed  their  fire  at 
the  particular  guns  assigned  them  ;  the  commanders  of  the  vessels 
were  satisfied  and  gratified  at  the  effect  of  the  shells  on  parapets, 
traverses,  and  the  guns  of  the  enemy.  15 -inch  shells  with  bursting 
charges  of  13  lbs.,  11 -inch  with  bursting  charges  of  6  lbs.,  did 
their  work  superbly,  and  even  g-inch  shells  with  bursting  charges 
of  only  3  lbs.  were  not  to  be  despised,  and  besides,  there  were  a 
great  many  of  them.  Where  the  shells  fell  a  crater  would  appear, 
and  the  ability  to  fight  the  guns  was  in  a  large  degree  destroyed 
by  the  masses  of  sand  continually  thrown  around  them.  As  the 
result,  some  of  the  guns  of  the  enemy  were  feebly  served,  and  the 
greater  number  were  silent.  When  the  fort  no  longer  replied  to 
the  guns  of  the  fleet,  signal  would  be  made  to  fire  slowly ;  one  gun 
at  a  time  from  every  vessel  would  then  be  directed  as  at  target 
practice,  against  the  particular  object.  The  enemy  at  times  would 
be  induced  by  this  slow  firing  to  open  fire  again,  but  only  to  re- 
ceive such  a  storm  of  shells  in  return,  as  to  squelch  him.  One  of 
my  Confederate  friends  who  was  in  the  fort,  recently  told  me  that 


the  effect  of  the  fire  was  so  damaging  and  overwhelming  that  they 
literally  could  do  nothing ;  great  logs  of  wood,  fifty  feet  in  length, 
on  the  parapet,  would  be  thrown  from  their  bed  and  tossed  in  the 
air  by  a  shell  that  had  buried  itself  in  the  parapet.  When  night- 
fall of  the  second  day  came,  and  the  wooden  vessels  were  again 
withdrawn,  certainly  the  fort  had  a  sorry  appearance,  and  many  of 
the  guns  had  been  rendered  useless. 

In  an  interview  that  night,  Admiral  Porter  and  Gen.  Terry 
agreed  upon  an  assault  at  noon  on  the  next  day.  A  naval  con- 
tingent of  i, 600  blue  jackets  and  400  marines  was  to  assault  the 
sea  face;  the  movement  was  to  be  made  from  the  northward 
along  the  beach  to  the  northeast  bastion. 

The  third  day,  until  the  time  of  the  assault,  which  was  about 
3  o'clock,  the  fleet  maintained  a  slow  but  constant  fire  on  the 
fort  without  being  favored  with  a  reply.  During  the  night  the 
army  had  made  an  extended  line  of  pits  close  up  under  the 
stockade  of  the  fort  on  the  land  side,  and  occupied  them.  When 
the  assault  came,  the  movement  was  begun  from  them ;  the  troops 
were  managed  in  the  most  courageous  and  dexterous  manner, 
and  carried  the  seven  most  westerly  traverses  with  little  loss: 
then  followed  the  most  stubborn  fighting  from  traverse  to  traverse, 
the  huge  shells  of  the  ironclads  clearing  the  spaces  between  the 
traverses  as  the  troops  advanced,  and  thus  the  battle  raged  when 
daylight  no  longer  served  for  firing  shells  ;  our  troops  had  then 
carried  the  bastion  and  a  traverse,  or  more,  on  the  sea  face.  It 
was  not  until  ten  o'clock  that  the  enemy  laid  down  his  arms. 

The  blue  jackets  and  marines  under  Breese  moved  as  soon  as 
the  army  began  the  assault ;  a  certain  number,  as  a  skirmish  line, 
had  dug  trenches  and  pits  at  some  distance  from  the  northeast 
bastion,  and  occupied  them  in  the  forenoon.  The  body  of  the 
naval  force  landed  later,  and  advanced  over  a  considerable  stretch 
of  open  beach,  and  of  necessity,  in  masses ;  the  loss  was  heavy, 
and  although  a  part  of  the  force  actually  reached  the  stockade 


—  7  — 

at  the  bastion,  its  greatest  use,  unhappily,  was  to  divert  a  very 
considerable  number  of  the  enemy  from  the  land  face  upon  which 
the  army  attack  was  made.  The  fort  was  gallantly  taken,  although 
the  naval  assaulting  column  did  not  reach  the  parapet. 

All  that  night,  in  the  distance,  the  sky  was  lurid  with  the 
flames  of  the  burning  works,  abandoned  by  the  enemy.  Although 
the  battle  was  over,  the  hand  of  the  destroyer  yet  lingered.  At 
sunrise,  on  the  15th,  the  main  magazine  of  the  fort  exploded, 
burying  200  or  more  persons,  friends  and  foes  alike,  beneath  the 
falling  masses.  The  supposed  cause  is  asserted,  that  some  drunken 
men  entered  the  magazine  with  a  light,  expecting  to  find  liquor. 
The  army  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  is  given  at  700,  and  the 
navy  loss  at  383,  including  20  missing,  supposed  to  have  been 
blown  up  by  the  explosion. 

Fort  Fisher  was  regarded  as  one  of  the  strongest  earthworks 
ever  constructed  as  against  ships.  It  mounted  some  40  guns, 
almost  without  exception  of  heavy  caliber :  15  of  them  were, 
permanently  disabled,  generally  on  the  land  face.  In  the  first 
bombardment  a  number  of  our  Parrott  guns  burst,  causing  a 
serious  loss  of  life.  In  the  second  bombardment,  the  Admiral 
issued  an  order  forbidding  the  use  of  rifles.  Against  earthworks, 
when  employed  within  2,000  yards,  spherical  shells  serve  a  more 
effective  purpose,  in  my  belief,  than  the  same  weight  of  projectiles 
from  rifles ;  the  latter  have  too  much  penetration  and  the  burst- 
ing charges  are  too  small  to  form  craters. 

There  were  thrown  by  the  fleet  into  Fort  Fisher  22,000  spher- 
ical shells,  containing  heavy  bursting  charges  and  weighing  no 
less  than  2,200,000  pounds. 

As  we  all  know,  a  brick  or  stone  fort  can  soon  be  destroyed 
by  rifled  guns  of  inconsiderable  power  at  a  distance  of  4,000 
yards  or  more.  Nevertheless,  the  superiority  of  spherical  shell- 
guns  against  earth  or  stone  works,  when  within  a  mile,  is  estab- 
lished in   the  belief  of  most  naval  men,  and  they  would  say  the 


t^- 


more  guns  are  brought  against  the  earthwork  the  better.  We 
have  reason  to  believe  such  batteries  as  we  fought,  are  quite  within 
the  control  of  the  numbers  of  guns  that  can  readily  be  brought 
against  them  by  even  an  insignificant  naval  power.  Perhaps  for 
this  reason  naval  officers  of  high  rank  in  our  service,  without 
exception,  so  far  as  I  know,  regard  favorably  for  land  defence, 
revolving  turrets  of  large  dimensions,  known  popularly  as  the 
"  Timby  system."  Had  our  forts  such  appendages  there  would 
be  no  enfilading  them,  nor  would  it  be  possible  to  cover  the 
guns  with  sand  when  shelled,  as  is  the  case  with  sand  batteries. 
To  ensure  the  turrets  working  satisfactorily,  it  seems  to  me  that 
they  should  be  water  borne,  which  would  be  the  least  expensive 
foundation  possible  for  such  great  weights.  These  ideas  are  given 
for  the  reason  that  the  Loyal  Legion  cannot  be  indifferent  as  to 
the  best  coast  defence,  and  if  our  naval  operations  during  our 
civil  war  have  afforded  any  lessons,  as  at  Fort  Fisher,  we  should 
carefully  weigh  their  import. 


UNIVERSITY  OF  N.C.  AT  CHAPEL  HILL 


00032742346 


FOR  USE  ONLY  IN 
THE  NORTH  CAROLINA  COLLECTION 


